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Rachel Scott. The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010.

In her book The Challenge of Political Islam, Rachel Scott raises timely and serious
questions about the ways in which the status of the Copts, Egypt’s native Christians, might be
affected should an Islamic state be established in Egypt. She attempts to answer these questions
by providing the reader with a modernist deconstructionist approach to both Islamist and
Western values. She debuts her argument by destabilizing Islamist ideology and Sharia (Islamic
law). Scott contends that Islam and Sharia are not monolithic entities and are therefore subject to
reinterpretation to accommodate modern values like democracy, tolerance, equality, and
citizenship. Rejecting the view that secularism has a monopoly on tolerance, she starts a
discourse on the possibility of establishing a religious Islamic state in Egypt that is tolerant
toward the Copts and other non-Islamic groups who share the country with the Muslim Sunni
majority. Proceeding with her argument, she questions the definition and application of terms
like tolerance, equality, and citizenship, with the purpose of allowing for the redefinition of these
terms within an Islamic context.
She begins by taking to task Hassan El- Banna, the most influential of modern Islamic
authors and ideologues and the founder of the biggest and the most influential Muslim group to
date, the Muslim Brotherhood. She refutes his claims that “Islam is a complete system which
deals with all areas of life” and points to the Quran’s very general guidelines regarding the
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. She also takes note of how these guidelines
have evolved and changed according to historical context, whether during prophet Muhammed’s
life or later during the golden age of the Islamic empire. She demonstrates how the application of
Islamic laws regulating and defining the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in
Egypt has evolved over time. She reviews the Dhimma contract, the Covenant of Umar, and the
Millet System, all of which were laws predicated upon tolerating the existence of others
(including the Copts), permitting non-Muslims to retain their religious identities and guarantying
non-Muslims’ safety among a Muslim majority, though sometimes for a tax. She cautions,
however, that these series of laws, despite their differences, emphasized the political supremacy
and dominance of Islam and made no presumption of equality between Muslims and nonMuslims. She adds that even when Egypt became a nation state in 1923 and the role of Sharia as
the source of all legislation was reduced in favor of Western laws, forcing the Millet System to
give way to Personal Status Law, this secularization of Egypt did not dismantle the country’s
Islamic identity, and many aspects of Islamic identity were, in fact, maintained, including the
Hatti Humayun decree, which restricted church building and repair and restricted the freedom of
Coptic Christianity and any other non-Muslim religion. At the same time, the new, more secular
Personal Status Law further reduced the autonomy of the Coptic community, despite allowing
the Copts self-rule in matters of family affairs. Scott argues that the establishment of the Muslim
Brotherhood in 1928 by El-Banna, who called for the abolition of the secular state and a return to
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the Islamic Caliphate, revealed, among Muslims, dissatisfaction with the overall secularization
and Westernization of Egypt.
Scott explains that the Islamic political scene in Egypt today, whether conservative,
moderate, or radical, is the brainchild of the Muslim Brotherhood ideologies. She particularly
examines the moderate pragmatic Muslim Brotherhood ideologies and locates in these the
possibility of a meaningful citizenship for the Copts, although she admits that the definition of
citizenship in an Islamic state remains a contested domain. She also acknowledges the existence
of conservative and radical thoughts stemming from the writings of the influential Islamist
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who promoted violence against the secular state and non-Muslims.
His thoughts and ideas influenced, to different degrees, the members of the Brotherhood.
Different interpretations of his writings caused the division of the Muslim Brotherhood into
several groups, some of which were and still are militant in their opposition to the secular state
and the Copts. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and Jihad are two such militant groups active in South
and North of Egypt responsible for several attacks on Copts, tourists, secular Muslims, and
politicians. However, the author does report that Al-Jama’a has lately denounced violence
against Muslims, and the Jihad are said to have been decimated during confrontations with the
police.
The reformist wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, in which Scott locates her hope for the
Copts, distanced itself from the ideas of Qutb, rejected violence against the State, preached
incremental advances toward an Islamic state, and called for a “democratic mechanism of the
modern civil state” founded on justice and equity without discriminating against color, race, or
religion (50). However, she warns that there is tension inside the group between the
conservatives and the moderates, and at times, she explains, the conservatives assume control.
Scott contends that these differences should be seen in light of development and change,
although secular Muslims and many Copts tend to view these frequent changes of leadership and
ideologies from conservative to moderate and back again as a political ploy by the Brotherhood,
who want to reach political control at any price and wouldn’t hesitate to use deception of the
public to achieve such goals. At the same time, Scott provides narratives that support the
suspicions of the secular Muslims and the Copts. For example, she explains that the Muslim
Brotherhood’s success in infiltrating the professional syndicates and their efforts within those
organizations resulted in the spawning of another political group called “Al-Wasat,” or “the
middle.” Al-Wasat members had their own disputes with The Muslim Brotherhood and accused
its members of dictatorship and not believing in democracy or humanity. Still, when the
moderate Al-Wasat members were refused political party status by the government, many of
them rejoined the Muslim Brotherhood.
Scott sums up the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood, in general, in their desire to
widely apply the Sharia. However, the implications of a widespread application of Sharia and
how this application might affect the status of the Copts hasn’t been clarified by the
Brotherhood, which has so far avoided articulating in detail a position regarding the status of the
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Copts. Scott then discusses the status quo of the Copts in Egypt under the Mubarak regime’s
constitution. She notes that the Copts have a history of religious reform and revival and that their
current Pope has emerged as their political leader and representative in front of the State. Pope
Shenoudah summed up the Copts requests in 1977 when he demanded that officials stop
applying Sharia to Copts, end the restrictions on building and restoring churches, end
discrimination in state employment, and be allowed to publish books on Coptic history and
traditions. These demands were never met. On the contrary, Sadat, the Egyptian President at the
time, changed the constitution to read that Sharia would be the major source of legislation.
Several confrontations ensued between the Pope and Sadat, who finally exiled the Pope to his
monastery in the desert. The conflict with political authority came to an end with Sadat’s
assassination and Mubarak’s coming into power. The latter restored the Pope to his position. At
the same time, sectarian violence continued to erupt. Al-Jamaa Al-Islamyia was held responsible
for several attacks, which continued into Mubarak’s rule. Prominent Copts like Yusuf Sidhum
blame the state for these incidents because it continues to allow extremism to flourish and turns a
blind eye toward the perpetrators of such crimes. Scott argues that the State avoids the debate on
the Coptic situation altogether, under the pretext of protecting national unity and to avoid
defining itself as a Muslim or a secular state.
Current discussion about the status of the Copts in Muslim political literature in Egypt
reflects both the views of mainstream Islamists, who seek to reestablish the Dhimma contract, in
which Copts are a tolerated, protected group within a Muslim-dominant society and radicals,
who see the Copts as enemies and unbelievers and, therefore, believe that the Dhimma contract
should be revoked, the result of which would be an Egypt within which the Copts have virtually
no place to safely exist, requiring them to convert or leave. The Wassatyia intellectuals, (the
moderate Islamists), however, believe that yet another alternative exists. They believe it is
possible to revise Islamic jurisprudence by separating it from Islam; they see the Dhimma
contract as a result of specific historical conditions that are no longer valid and, therefore,
believe that the Dhimma contract can be done away with, opening the gates for citizenship for
Copts in an Islamic state. The moderate Al-Wassatyia party, for example, views Islamic
civilization as made up of both Muslims and non-Muslims. Citizenship in an Islamic State,
however, while an approximation of the modern concept of citizenship, is not the same civic
concept as it is defined elsewhere. Citizenship for Copts hasn’t been defined by the Islamists
yet. However, indications of the limitations of Copt “citizenship” appear in the comments of
Wassatyia intellectuals like Tareq El-Bishry, who says that it is impossible, for example, for a
non-Muslim man to marry a Muslim woman. “Citizenship” in this context is based upon loyalty
and friendship between Muslims and Copts as well as common history and struggles. Muslim
Brotherhood intellectuals themselves disagree on the interpretation of equality and rights for the
Copts. Some of them speak about equal rights, whereas others interpret citizenship to be an
extension of the Dhimma contract, in which the rights of the Copts are limited. Scott cautions,
however, that such conflicts also exist among Al-Wassatyia members. One Al-Wassatyia
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member, Imara, published a book in which he quoted medieval thinkers on the definition of
unbelief and the legality of killing non-Muslims. Copts saw this publication as contradictory to
Imara’s previously stated ideas on citizenship and equality, and he was forced to offer a public
apology for his quotes.
According to Scott, most Copts do not support Wassatyia intellectuals and are in favor of
a secular state. However, like Scott, some Copts believe that there may be some convergence
between the Copts’ own demands and the Wassatyia concept of Islamic citizenship. Scott argues
that the Copts are themselves a religious community and that they would not prefer, necessarily,
to live in a secular state. She asserts that the Copts simply want the same autonomy granted to
other religious groups under Sharia. She argues that the Copts may be able to negotiate for a
construct of citizenship within an Islamic Egypt that would guarantee them self rule in personal
status matters (an issue the Copts refuse to give up). Additionally, she says, they may be able to
negotiate more political and social participation in the State.
With the current political situation and the collapse of the Mubarak regime and the
revision of the Egyptian Constitution, including Article Two, which pertains to Sharia as a main
source of legislation, the Copts are mainly concerned about the application of Sharia at this time.
Even if a secular state is established, the Muslim Brotherhood has managed to Islamize Egypt,
and, therefore, the application of the law will disfavor Christian values in favor of Muslim
principles. At the same time, if Sharia becomes the source of legislation, the Copts may be
permitted self-rule in family affairs but will simultaneously have to face Islamic penal laws and
fear gross discrimination in the application of such laws to Christians. Still, the Coptic Church is
encouraging the Copts to participate in the political process so that they may be able to secure
some say in shaping their political future in Egypt.
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